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Since the early 1990s, Australia’s Mandarin-speaking popu-
lation has grown rapidly, with approximately 1.2 million 
people of Chinese ancestry participating in the 2016 Census. 
Between the 2006 and 2016 Censuses, Chinese-language 
speakers grew from 2.6% of the Australian population to 
nearly 4%. The number of Chinese Australian voters is grow-
ing accordingly, with around 510,000 born in China and 
597,000 speaking Mandarin at home (Sun, 2019).
Australia’s 2019 federal election campaign marked a deci-
sive “coming of age” for ethnic communities such as Chinese 
migrants (Jakubowicz, 2019). For the first time, a political 
debate between two candidates was held in Mandarin (Dingle, 
2019), and the Chinese social media platform WeChat became 
a battlefield where candidates from different sides held live 
WeChat sessions with Chinese Australian voters (Sun, 2019). 
Bill Shorten made history by becoming the first Labor leader 
to hold live interactive WeChat sessions with Mandarin-
speaking voters.
As WeChat’s impact in Australia is increasingly felt, 
Australian media commentators have voiced a number of 
concerns about the platform, especially in the lead-up to the 
May 2019 federal election. These concerns range from the 
perennial fear that the Communist Party of China (CPC) is 
using WeChat to influence the election, to a generalized 
worry that politicians’ use of WeChat may pose a threat to 
national security.
What is conspicuously missing in these commentaries is 
WeChat’s educational role in political communication: to 
what extent does WeChat educate new citizens about 
Australia’s political system, democratic values, and electoral 
processes? Does it assist such individuals to become more 
engaged in politics and better-informed about their voting 
options? A portrait of Mandarin-speaking, WeChat-using 
voters during an election campaign is still largely missing. 
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Abstract
With the number of Mandarin-speaking migrants on the rise in Australia and the centrality of Chinese social media platforms 
among a large majority of this cohort, it is time that we examined the role of WeChat in political communication and 
citizenship education among Chinese migrants. In the lead-up to the May 2019 federal election, WeChat became a political 
campaigning battlefield in which candidates held live WeChat sessions with Chinese Australian voters. Despite much 
discussion about WeChat’s impact on Australian politics, there is little understanding of its potential educational role in 
citizen-making: to what extent does WeChat educate new citizens about Australia’s political system, democratic values, 
and electoral processes? This article uses the 2019 federal election as a prism through which to explore civic education and 
citizen-making in the digital space of WeChat. Drawing on online surveys, sustained digital ethnographic observation, and 
in-depth one-on-one interviews, we ask whether and how the work of certain individuals in this digital space engenders 
a new form of community leadership and a more engaged form of civic behavior. We also assess WeChat’s potential in 
facilitating the process of political integration for new migrants from authoritarian societies.
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But such a portrait is one important piece in the increasingly 
complex jigsaw puzzle of digital media and citizen-making 
in Australia, at a time when the political landscape is chang-
ing dramatically.
Australia’s new Mandarin-speaking migrants are diverse 
in terms of age, education, gender, socioeconomic back-
ground, degree of cultural integration, level of English profi-
ciency, and engagement with English-language media. But 
there are some commonalities among them. First, they are 
first-generation migrants from a country with one-party rule, 
meaning that they need to unlearn those political attitudes that 
are conditioned by living in an authoritarian polity, while also 
learning to live in a democratic system. Second, these 
Mandarin-speaking migrants are not—yet—integrated within 
the community-based ethnic organizations constituted by 
older, largely Cantonese-speaking migrants and thus are typi-
cally not part of what Wells (2015, p. 5) calls “legacy civic 
groups,” which usually exercise power and influence through 
an institutionally legitimated hierarchy of expertise and 
authority. Also noteworthy about this cohort is that a large 
majority of them prefer WeChat, a social media platform 
from China, to other popular platforms in their everyday and 
political communication.
These factors have a number of significant analytical 
implications for our understanding of this cohort and their 
political communication. First, People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) migrants, who were schooled in the Chinese polity to 
accept only a certain kind of “communicative relationship” 
with government, media, and other institutions, now need to 
get used to a different “information dynamics” (Wells, 2015) 
in Australia. For this cohort, migration necessitates a shift 
from a “digital culture” conditioned and permitted by author-
itarian Party-state rule—what some commentators call 
“authoritarianism 2.0” (Stockmann, 2014–2019)—to a set of 
digital “norms, practices, and expectations” (Deuze, 2006, 
n.1) that are taken for granted by digital citizens in a liberal 
democracy.
Second, migration thereby entails living out the clash 
between older and newer media logics, while also routinely 
navigating the tension and incompatibility—culturally, ideo-
logically, and politically—between Chinese and globally cir-
culated information, ideas, and opinions. In the globally 
prevalent “hybrid media system” (Chadwick, 2013) that fea-
tures a clash between older and newer media technologies 
and logics, Mandarin-speaking PRC migrants have to take on 
an even more complex and conflicted dimension in light of 
two parallel media and communication systems that they are 
exposed to before and after migration: one is composed of 
China-based social media and e-commerce platforms mostly 
owned by Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, and the other of the 
major global platforms—Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and 
Instagram—that are inaccessible inside China. Third, as a 
result of the exposure to new communicative and information 
dynamics and system, these PRC migrants are compelled to 
live within a different “citizenship regime” (Isin, 2015, p. 54) 
from the one they were familiar with in China, where civil 
society and a public sphere are largely absent.
In view of these distinctive features, an understanding of 
the role that the growing use of social media plays in this 
cohort’s efforts to participate in Australia’s political and civic 
processes becomes more urgent than ever. In the wake of the 
2019 election, Anthony Pun, national president of the 
Chinese Community Council of Australia and Chair of the 
Multicultural Communities Council of New South Wales, 
observed on Facebook:
Older Chinese-Australians may be hindered by cultural 
indoctrination about the avoidance of politics, but the new 
generations have no such baggage; and they will behave like any 
other Australians in search of political participation, seeking 
public office and having a proportional say in the nation’s 
business.
Pun’s observation invites an important question: are there 
new opinion leaders among first-generation Mandarin-
speaking migrants on WeChat who embody a new style of 
political participation that is more interactive, networked, 
and participatory? And who assumes the role of civic educa-
tors in this space, how do they operate, and what can their 
actions and strategies tell us about new migrants’ prospects 
for political integration, especially those from authoritarian 
societies?
Our main objective is to understand how some individuals 
engage in myriad digital practices in order to inform and 
influence fellow Mandarin-speaking voters. In particular, we 
ask whether and how the work of certain new leaders in the 
digital space potentially engenders a more engaged form of 
civic behavior within their communities, thereby also edu-
cating individuals about democratic systems and values.
There has been a growing body of work on digital citizen-
ship. But existing work on this topic tends to emphasize the use 
of digital communication platforms in revolutionary and/or 
prodemocracy movements in authoritarian societies (Wolfsfeld 
et al., 2013). Alternatively, it tends to focus on socially and eco-
nomically marginalized citizens (e.g., youth, the disabled, and 
women) seeking visibility, voice, and political representation in 
democratic yet increasingly neoliberal and unequal societies 
(Johns & Cheong, 2019; Vromen, 2012, 2017). In other words, 
the notion of digital citizenship is mostly invoked “negatively 
to address problems, with less attention to the promises of cre-
ative culture and alternative modes of participation” (McCosker 
et al., 2016, p. 1). Furthermore, and perhaps most relevant to 
this discussion, it is still not clear how this digital citizenship as 
a theoretical framework can be operationalized in the context 
of the myriad shifts experienced by migrants and diasporic 
communities who move from an authoritarian to a liberal-dem-
ocratic society.
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, several key con-
ceptual insights into digital citizenship are particularly help-
ful in achieving these objectives. First, accepting Isin and 
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Ruppert’s (2015, p. 10) argument that “who we become as 
political subjects . . . is neither given or determined but 
enacted by what we do in relation to others and things,” we 
found it methodologically useful to examine the digital citi-
zen whose political subjectivity was in the process of becom-
ing. Second, we approached the process of citizen-making 
through the prism of individuals’ social media activities—
their “digital acts,” which, like speech acts, position them as 
“performative rights-claiming subjects” (p. 13). Given that 
politics and the media have become inseparable due to an 
accelerated degree of mediatization, studies of citizenship 
must consider citizens’ media use and their experience of 
digital communication as intertwined and inseparable (Esser 
& Strömbäck, 2014). Furthermore, democracy in the digital 
age must locate new spaces of participation and engagement, 
to take into account the networked and private nature of 
political communication (Papacharissi, 2010; Skocpol, 
2003). Third, we focused on what individuals did with politi-
cal information before, during, and after the election. This 
approach draws on existing work arguing that questions of 
citizen-making in the digital era are first and foremost ques-
tions of how individuals engage and interact with “civic 
information,” defined as “the continuous flow of acts, opin-
ions, and ideas that help citizens understand matters of 
potentially public concern and identify opportunities for 
action” (Wells, 2015, p. 7).
We were not interested in the outcome and processes of 
the 2019 election per se; rather, we saw the election as a 
prism through which we could explore civic education and 
citizen-making in the digital space. Nor did we intend to con-
duct a study of influence and influencers and how they oper-
ated within WeChat to influence fellow Chinese migrants’ 
voting choices—that is an important topic that deserves a 
separate discussion. Instead, we were mainly interested in 
the teaching of a new citizenship ethos and practices, and the 
role these leaders play in this process during the period of the 
election. This approach is based on the view that elections 
are sites where citizenship is performed most vividly and 
immediately and are the most conventional form of demo-
cratic expression (Bilodeau, 2016). Electoral voting provides 
a baseline measure of citizens’ political participation and 
constitutes a defining aspect of democracy in a society. The 
election campaign is also where citizenship is formed and 
enacted and where normative understandings of political 
participation and citizenship are displayed and performed on 
a large scale (Baldwin-Philippi, 2015, p. 7).
Our research draws on several empirical sources: two 
online surveys, sustained digital ethnographic observation, 
and in-depth one-on-one interviews. The surveys are used to 
contextualize our research, providing a useful sense of the 
general pattern of digital practices. Building on our under-
standing of this general pattern, we adopted participatory 
digital ethnographic methods over 5 months in 2019, which 
involved a sustained collection of digital data from various 
chat groups, thereby allowing us to identify the key opinion 
leaders and trends in those discussions. The semistructured 
interviews enabled us to zoom in “up close and personal,” 
and engage in a more in-depth analysis of the online behav-
ior and discourses of selected key figures in WeChat groups.
Our discussion, in what follows, has three parts. We first 
outline preliminary findings from our surveys and ethno-
graphic observation, and then we provide a more substantial 
and fine-grained discussion of the activities of five active 
WeChat users. Finally, we summarize our findings and draw 
out their critical implications vis-à-vis the concept of digital 
citizenship.
Approaching WeChat as a New Civic 
Space
The first of our two large surveys was conducted among 
Mandarin-speaking migrants from the PRC in September 
2018, looking at their media access and usage patterns. We 
recruited a convenience sample of 646 people largely via 
social media platforms—especially WeChat and Facebook; 
of these, 528 individuals completed all key questions. The 
majority (over 90%) of our respondents were Australian per-
manent residents or naturalized Australian citizens; 85% of 
them had an undergraduate degree or higher, and 70% of 
them were working.
The results made it clear that, since WeChat was a rela-
tively new social media platform that Chinese Australians 
would use to access information about party policies, schol-
ars of social media needed to go beyond the dominant frame-
work of Chinese propaganda and control and also approach 
WeChat as a new potential civic space. Moreover, a majority 
of respondents believed that the major political parties would 
use WeChat to win Chinese votes (see Figure 1).
The second survey, which was conducted in February 
2019 using the same methods, recruited 927 Chinese partici-
pants, with 786 people completing all key questions, which 
this time focused on their media and news access and con-
sumption habits and preferred platforms or sources. The 
majority of respondents were either Australian citizens (282 
individuals – 36% of respondents) or Australian permanent 
residents (245 individuals – 31%); 89% were under 55 years 
old, 87% had an undergraduate degree or higher, 93% 
claimed adequate English proficiency, 71% were working 
either full-time or part-time, and 60% were female.
In this survey, we asked those who were naturalized citi-
zens (and thus able to vote) to identify their main sources of 
information about state and federal elections. For many, an 
important source of information and influence was WeChat’s 
“Moments” feature, which is similar to Facebook’s timeline 
except that Moments can only be accessed by a person’s 
friends and acquaintances. Around 26% of citizens surveyed 
said that friends’ Moments postings were a primary source of 
political information. A further 22% cited WeChat groups as 
another important source of electoral information. Both 
groups tended not to invest much time in deciding how to 
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vote. They trusted the opinions of friends more than the 
media, politicians, and public commentators. People in these 
groups were also often less educated, less proficient in 
English, or less engaged in politics. This means that around 
half of our survey participants access information and opin-
ions about political parties and voting options from WeChat.
In our second survey, as many as 50% of Chinese Australian 
respondents named mainstream English-language media as a 
source of information and opinion on politics. However, as we 
discuss below, such information is only consumed after it has 
been processed, curated, and framed within a particular edito-
rial stance by bilingual gatekeepers within the Chinese-
speaking community, and delivered mostly via WeChat.
In addition to these surveys, between January and May 
2019 we engaged in participatory observation in 45 politically 
or electorally oriented WeChat groups with members mostly 
based in Melbourne, Sydney, Perth, or nationally. During the 
same period, we also talked to a large number of community 
members in these groups and participated in several Chinese 
community events that were coordinated via WeChat. While 
these surveys, meetings, and discussions in WeChat groups 
offer useful insights about the “silent majority” of WeChat 
users, we also conducted one-on-one, semistructured formal 
interviews with 10 prominent and outspoken individuals 
recruited via WeChat groups, either in person or via telephone. 
Each interview lasted up to 1 hr, with a focus on their media 
habits, their views on the roles they played in chat groups, and 
the role WeChat played in the political lives of Chinese 
Australians. The interviews were compiled into a table using 
thematic grouping and comparative analysis and were used to 
supplement these individuals’ WeChat activities and mes-
sages, which we collected through embedded and participa-
tory digital ethnography methods.
Drawing on methods in social media ethnography, we 
researched the “‘intensities’ of social media activity and 
sociality that span online and offline” and social media per-
formances that are “interwoven with the qualities, political 
structures and histories of localities or regions” (Postill & 
Pink, 2012, pp. 123, 125). We were thus able to contextualize 
our WeChat group data within our reflections on the power 
structures and intertextual relationships of digital and non-
digital texts and discourses, both on and off social media, in 
relation to Chinese migrants WeChatting about the 2019 
Australian federal election.
Negotiating Boundaries and 
Performing Digital Acts
Our study found that one key aspect of understanding 
WeChat is its possibly unique set of affordances, which give 
the platform a distinctive capacity for certain kinds of inclu-
sion and exclusion. WeChat functions as a closed and private 
ecosystem. Like WhatsApp, it allows individuals to create 
public chat groups, as well as private groups protected by a 
four-digit passcode or approved by the group administrator. 
Membership of each WeChat group is capped at 500, a limit 
imposed by the Chinese authorities most likely to minimize 
the spread of counter-government information. To join any 
chat group, one needs to either scan the group’s QR code or 
be added by a group member (sometimes pending the group 
administrator’s approval). If members do not adhere to group 
rules, they can be ousted by the group leader—usually the 
person who started the group. Individuals can also choose to 
make their Moments visible to some and invisible to others; 
they can upload text, images, or videos, and those friends 
who are given access can view and comment on these posts, 
as with Facebook and Twitter.
We found that normally the sense of belonging and emo-
tional commitment to public WeChat groups was tenuous. 
Most people in chat groups tend not to participate in debates 
and discussions. Typically, they are seeking or sharing informa-
tion, advertising, exchanging ideas with like-minded others, 
lurking for useful information (e.g., journalists), researching, or 
simply “having fun.” People sometimes quit groups or “go div-
ing” (qianshui—become invisible or quiet) because of a lack of 
time, commitment, or interest.
We also found that the boundaries between WeChat 
groups were fluid, with many people joining multiple groups, 
Figure 1. Chinese Australian citizens living in Australia: How big a role do you think WeChat will play in the 2019 Federal election?
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and messages crisscrossing between those groups. In the 
election campaign, for example, more than a dozen new, 
politically oriented groups sprang up. Some emerged because 
of special WeChat events (e.g., WeChat live chats with Labor 
MPs); others had been set up prior to community events for 
communication and coordination. Those who were active in 
political discussions were mostly either Liberal or Labor 
supporters who joined as many groups as possible. They not 
only crossed the boundaries of otherwise private and closed 
groups, but they also brokered messages and conversations 
across different groups. Thus, parallel conversations around 
the same topic could arise simultaneously in different groups, 
often initiated by an individual posting the same message in 
multiple groups, and also forwarding messages from one 
group to another. Accordingly, group boundaries collapsed, 
and chat groups became more transparent. WeChat groups 
that were established for live sessions with politicians usu-
ally continued as platforms for ongoing debate. Opinions 
from these forums often percolated into WeChat Moments 
spaces inhabited by everyday users who were less politically 
involved and not part of any WeChat groups. So, although it 
was impossible for us to quantify the flow of information 
from groups to Moments, it is fair to conclude that material 
originally posted in groups can influence WeChat users out-
side those groups.
Many new PRC migrants join these politically oriented 
WeChat groups to find out how the voting system works, to 
learn about the major political parties and to participate in 
political debate during election campaigns. While this is an 
important first step toward becoming an active and politi-
cally engaged citizen, it can be a slow and difficult process 
for them to truly embrace democratic values such as equality 
and respect. Having spent their formative years in a one-
party state, these newcomers to Western-style democracy 
now have to unlearn political values that were conditioned 
by living within an authoritarian polity and must start to 
adopt new political sensibilities. One is the ethos of respect-
fully disagreeing with fellow citizens with different political 
points of view; another is a willingness to accept fellow citi-
zens who have different identity politics—for example, in 
terms of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or life-
style. Within WeChat, this means learning ways of commu-
nicating, debating, and disagreeing with others with civility 
and respect.
When interacting with strangers in a large WeChat group, 
one does not know their gender, age, profession, location, 
race, ethnicity, or citizenship status. WeChat’s anonymity 
allows people to express themselves freely and engage in 
frank discussions without fear of being identified, especially 
when discussing Australian politics. While this enables free-
dom of expression, it can also facilitate wars of words, allow-
ing people to post derogatory and discriminatory remarks or 
circulate fake news, without being held accountable.
Acutely aware of WeChat’s capacity to block content 
based on certain keywords and images, the leaders of these 
groups constantly remind members not to discuss Chinese 
politics. Even though users who sign up using a non-Chinese 
ID are subject to less scrutiny and face less severe conse-
quences, most WeChat groups see it as their responsibility to 
rein in any discussions that stray into Chinese politics, with 
such posts as, “No Chinese politics, please. We’re in Australia, 
and we’re only concerned with Australian politics.”
It became clear to us that participants in live, politically 
oriented WeChat sessions are among the Mandarin-speaking 
community’s more politically engaged individuals. Members 
in these groups can be divided into several types: the silent 
majority, who mostly “watch and learn”; the vocal minority, 
whose views may or may not have wide resonance; opinion 
leaders, who exercise influence on critical issues; lobbyists, 
who advocate on behalf of one particular party; and group 
managers, who are responsible for the behavior of the mem-
bers in the group and have the power to “kick out” anyone 
who does not abide by group protocols. From both Labor and 
Coalition camps, new leaders are emerging to play an active 
role in debating and interpreting the policy statements of poli-
ticians and their parties, taking it upon themselves to repost 
news stories, op-eds, and tweets from English-language media 
outlets, sometimes with a Chinese précis of the content.
Exemplary Citizens—A Group Portrait
Despite variations in communication styles, informational 
strategies, and political preferences, it is clear some individ-
uals gained exceptionally high visibility, not only through 
their constant presence and participation, but also, more 
importantly, through their capacity to shape the tenor, direc-
tion, and quality of debate in WeChat groups. We discuss five 
such individuals in detail here, not because they represent a 
comprehensive taxonomy of leadership styles, but because, 
together, they offer a fine-grained account of new attributes 
of leadership. All five are first-generation Chinese migrants 
over 45 years old—Australian citizens living in Melbourne, 
Sydney, and Perth—with two originally from Malaysia. 
While all five are male and heterosexual, we nevertheless 
focus on them because our intention is not to represent the 
Chinese migrant community but instead to use each of them 
to illustrate one important leadership quality, even though 
individually they may possess more than one leadership 
attribute. The diversity of the Chinese migrant community, in 
terms of attributes such as gender and age, needs to be taken 
into account in our research project, of which this article 
offers a snapshot.
Citizen 1: A New Civic Informational Style?
Citizen 1, aged 46, is the best-informed individual we came 
across in our research. He also possessed the best command 
of English. Educated in architecture at China’s Tsinghua 
University and initially employed in the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, he came to Australia in 1998 to join his wife 
6 Social Media + Society
who was sent to her Sydney office by her company. He 
became an Australian citizen in 2006, and currently operates 
a licensed post office in North Sydney. He is very active on 
WeChat, belonging to 12 politics-themed groups—eight 
Australia based and four U.S. based—and eight other groups. 
He does not own or manage any group. He uses WeChat 
mainly to share information, not to seek information.
Running a post office business and having plenty of read-
ing time on his hands, Citizen 1 spends a lot of time browsing 
Australian and international English-language media such 
as The Washington Post and The New York Times. Twitter is 
his preferred social media platform, while he uses WeChat to 
channel news and information from elsewhere to “friends” in 
chat groups. He is a frequent contributor to the “Letters to the 
Editor” section of major English newspapers such as The 
Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian, and always 
shares his published letters on his WeChat groups. Apart 
from the wide range of social issues he canvasses in his let-
ters, his WeChat posts also include screenshots of his acerbic 
Twitter responses to posts by Prime Minister Scott Morrison, 
Donald Trump, and other politicians.
Not only does Citizen 1 impress his groups with his grasp 
of mainstream news and current affairs issues, but his own 
actions also demonstrate to fellow citizens from authoritar-
ian China that they need not remain passive, afraid, or voice-
less; that they should feel confident about talking back to 
power, participating in public debate, and exercising their 
right as citizens to a political voice. It is worth noting that, in 
many cases, WeChat users bring mainstream media stories to 
WeChat with various intentions, including to inform, to vali-
date their own views, and to persuade others. The informa-
tion and views they share are not free from their own political 
stance; unlike journalists, they have no obligation to be 
impartial and objective. Any posting involves a choice—an 
act of filtering and gatekeeping—often to promote a particu-
lar point of view, or to support or provide ammunition against 
a particular party. Every member of a group can attempt to 
persuade others to vote one way or another, but some do it 
crudely and confrontationally, resorting to emotive language, 
while other respected and responsible opinion leaders such 
as Citizen 1 quote credible sources (e.g., mainstream media 
publications) and authorities (mainstream public figures) to 
make their point.
An example of how Citizen 1 does this comes from March 
2019, when he made three posts in quick succession. The 
first, in Chinese, said: “The Sydney Morning Herald reported 
eight years ago on Scott Morrison’s proposal to use anti-
Muslim sentiment to win votes—a claim that Morrison did 
not deny at that time.” His second post was a link to News.
com.au journalist Malcolm Farr’s recent story about 
Morrison accusing TV presenter Waleed Aly of lying over 
this issue. The third post quoted a few key paragraphs from 
Farr’s story. Citizen 1 is clearly a Labor supporter. Malcolm 
Farr’s story painted an unfavorable picture of Liberal leader 
Scott Morrison, implying that he was at best inconsistent, at 
worst a liar. Yet, Citizen 1 refrained from making any judge-
mental statements about Morrison and the Liberals, prefer-
ring to let Farr’s story speak for itself. Many people responded 
to his posts with either praise or a “thumbs-up” emoji.
Although Citizen 1 is acutely aware that an echo chamber 
effect is inevitable in WeChat communities, he strongly 
believes that group managers should encourage meaningful 
dialogue and that an individual’s political maturity is less 
related to their level of education than to their cultural back-
ground. He attributes a lack of critical thinking to the Chinese 
cultural and political context, particularly among conserva-
tives, who, he believes, subscribe to a social-Darwinian view 
and are more willing to listen to authority. Despite being 
a first-generation migrant himself, as are most others on 
WeChat, he stands out as a beacon of conscience, informing 
and guiding people through the treacherous waters of infor-
mation and opinion on Chinese social media.
Citizen 2: Fake News Buster
While Citizen 1 spends much time sorting, sharing, and scru-
tinizing news and information for fellow chat group mem-
bers, Citizen 2 has played a similar leadership role, but in a 
different style. Aged 52, he belongs to the “Tiananmen gen-
eration,” having participated as a leader in student protests, 
and subsequently faced unemployment upon graduating 
from a Shanghai university. He came to Australia in 1992 as 
an international student studying electronic engineering at 
Monash University and was naturalized in the late 1990s. He 
joined the Liberal Party in the early 2000s. Citizen 2 is a 
small business owner (first selling electronic appliances and 
now furniture), and since 2015 has spent considerable time 
on WeChat, using it mainly for interpersonal communication 
and political campaigning.
Based in Melbourne, he volunteers and manages his own 
chat groups for Chinese-speaking voters in Melbourne’s 
south-eastern suburbs, with most group members self-identi-
fying as Coalition supporters. He has also joined several 
other WeChat groups as an observer, mainly for gathering 
intelligence about public opinion on the major parties’ elec-
tion campaigns. Citizen 2 follows English-language media 
and frequently cites Liberal Party sources. On Facebook, he 
represents himself as a Chinese voice within closed Liberal 
groups, but he is more active on WeChat. His agenda is to 
promote Western values and styles among Chinese migrants. 
Not interested in debates with Labor supporters, he is more 
motivated to influence voters in the middle.
As digital platforms proliferate and the flow of content 
between them intensifies, being an active citizen entails 
being informationally responsible. This requires comprehen-
sive knowledge of what is being published in a wide range of 
outlets, in both English and Chinese, as well as sufficient 
media and technological literacy to discern what is credible 
information based on its source, attributes, and platform. 
Since access to timely and accurate civic information is 
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crucial to any democratic process, active citizens tend to see 
it as their duty to correct misinformation, fake news, and 
scams. Like Citizen 1, for Citizen 2, this not only means 
sharing and decoding news and messages, but also teaching 
group members how to recognize fake news, identify its 
source wherever possible, and stop it from spreading 
further.
Citizen 2 was among the first to call out fake news aimed 
at maligning Labor leader Bill Shorten, when a “doctored” 
Bill Shorten Twitter post was retweeted by a Liberal sup-
porter in his chat group. Unlike Citizen 1—who directly 
identified it as fake, pointing out that “it’s not from Shorten. 
Bill Shorten’s real Twitter handle is @billshortenmp”—
Citizen 2 responded to the person who posted it: “It’s origi-
nally from Twitter; you should identify the source when you 
forward it,” also posting a screenshot of the Twitter source. 
These efforts were soon picked up by other WeChat users 
and spread to other groups. The post can still be found in 
some groups because WeChat only allows a 2-min window 
for posts to be recalled or deleted. Our searches across sev-
eral groups show it appearing only on 5 May and not spread-
ing further, after it was called out by group members. The 
screenshot of the Twitter source was reposted several times 
afterward by group members echoing Citizen 2’s point that it 
is not fair to single out that particular post on WeChat, while 
the original source and chat group response were not reflected 
in the mainstream media.
Citizen 2 has subsequently warned fellow group members 
to take responsibility for their own online behavior and posts 
so that they cannot be used to further tarnish the reputation of 
Chinese in the mainstream media. In the interview, he 
lamented how fake news in chat groups and subsequent 
reportage of such in mainstream Australian media would 
damage the reputation of the whole Chinese community:
Fake news can be found in all social media platforms and needs 
to be exposed. Attacking WeChat [as the platform on which fake 
news appears] is like attacking Chinese users, and thus it reduces 
our discursive power, because fake news, like populism, does 
not represent what we are.
For Citizen 2, WeChat gives voice to ordinary Chinese-
speaking migrants, putting them on par with “traditional” 
community leaders (e.g., those from Malaysia and Hong 
Kong who speak better English). He also believes that, while 
WeChat and mainstream media are divided—by a language 
barrier and WeChat’s linkages with China—both are riddled 
with populism. WeChat is thus another battleground for him, 
not only in terms of party politics (trying to outwit Labor in 
the election campaign), but also in keeping Chinese voters 
informed about Australian political and cultural values, and 
promoting the interests of Chinese migrants irrespective of 
their political orientation. He is regarded by his supporters as 
a strategist and is ambitious to move up through the Liberal 
Party ranks.
Citizen 3: Contesting Old-Style Community 
Leadership
Citizen 3 is older, but from a similar background: he came to 
Australia from Shanghai as a student, and is now a small 
business owner. He enrolled in an English course when he 
arrived in 1989, bringing a degree and work experience in 
civil engineering with him, and became an Australian citizen 
in 1997. He was not much involved in Chinese community 
events until he took to WeChat in 2016, and found it to be a 
most efficient networking and communication platform. He 
soon found himself spending far too much time on WeChat, 
admitting to having become addicted to it. He now spends 1 
to 2 hr daily on WeChat.
Like Citizen 2, Citizen 3 also rejects the role of tradi-
tional community leaders who “speak” for the Chinese com-
munity to the government and media. WeChat has enabled 
him and others to exert influence directly among commu-
nity members without having to be fluent in English. Citizen 
3 mainly communicates in Chinese, previously via the 
Internet and email, now mainly via WeChat. Like other lead-
ers, he is ambivalent about the platform: while it enables 
grassroots community leadership to emerge and mobilizes 
ordinary people to engage in politics despite their lack of 
adequate English-language skills, he believes there is never-
theless too much advertising and sensationalism in WeChat 
subscription accounts.
Citizen 3 manages three chat groups and is also a member 
of several other politically oriented groups. He rarely engages 
in group discussions except in his own groups, but during the 
election campaign, he tried to influence others by posting 
long political commentaries regularly, if not daily, particu-
larly on issues related to infrastructure and military expendi-
ture. Unlike the other individuals studied here, Citizen 3 is 
not an avid consumer of English mainstream media, mainly 
gleaning information from online searches and WeChat. His 
use of WeChat is strategic—as a platform to publicize events 
he has organized, encourage group participation, and com-
municate the rules and protocols of these activities. A resi-
dent of Chisholm, he was keen to support candidates of 
Chinese origin in his electorate. He was the first to propose 
hosting a community event for Chisholm’s two candidates of 
Chinese heritage to meet community members, which later 
evolved into the first candidates’ debate in Chinese and 
English on 14 April, an event that received a lot of attention 
in mainstream English-language media.
WeChat was used to discuss, coordinate, and promote the 
event. Questions for the candidates were collected during the 
3 months before the event; 14 questions were shortlisted by 
members of many chat groups via SurveyMonkey and given 
to the two candidates 4 weeks before the debate. Citizen 3 
also circulated them widely and regularly in chat groups. He 
even tried to raise funding/sponsorship on WeChat for venue 
hire and catering, but ended up paying the costs out of his 
own pocket.
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Leading up to the debate, Citizen 3, with the assistance of 
two others, circulated bilingual posters, promoting the event 
in multiple chat groups. Citizen 3’s name and contact details 
were included on the poster. The English version simply said, 
“Liberal candidate Gladys Liu and Labor candidate Jennifer 
Yang will deliver their speeches and answer questions from 
voters.” The Chinese version, however, included more 
detailed instructions for attendees, encouraging Chinese 
Australians to embrace the “community spirit of Australia,” 
“show interest in public issues and community concerns” and 
“take concrete action to participate in Australia’s political 
process.” Attendees were urged to “ask questions in an orderly 
and civilized manner, respect candidates and other attendees 
regardless of their political preferences, and show apprecia-
tion with applause to all speakers.”
Citizen 3 told a reporter from the Chinese-language web-
site Melbourne Today about what motivated him to organize 
the event:
We should start to develop a sense of belonging to Australia as 
citizens of this country, and live up to the expectations of this 
new identity. This means participating in mainstream politics. 
Only through this process can we lift the political status of 
Chinese-Australians in this country. This is the best way of 
realizing our self-worth.
Citizen 3 is a consummate self-actualizing citizen. His 
involvement in the political process is voluntary, self-expres-
sive, and driven by a desire to gain political voice on behalf 
of the Chinese community, without being beholden to the 
hierarchal power structures of traditional Chinese commu-
nity organizations.
Citizen 4: Fighting for Equity and Justice
Citizen 4, in his mid-60s, is the oldest individual we profile in 
this article. He is not a PRC migrant, arriving in Melbourne 
from Malaysia in 1987, and he was naturalized in 1989. He is 
a retiree, having owned a small business in the past. As a 
Malaysian Chinese, Citizen 4 had already experienced the rac-
ism and social hierarchy that were played out in Malaysia, and 
is thus passionate about the need for Chinese Australians to 
break through the glass ceiling. To do this, he believes that 
Chinese migrants need to learn about and internalize Australian 
values and democratic practices.
Citizen 4 is a community activist, a strong advocate of 
multiculturalism, and a highly regarded member of the Labor 
Party in Victoria. Before the arrival of Chinese social media, 
he was a frequent contributor of articles and columns to 
Chinese community newspapers and websites. To connect 
with PRC migrants, he took up WeChat in 2016, where he 
now administers his own group and participates in several 
others. He is mainly interested in the role of Chinese 
Australians in Australian politics. Since he is not familiar 
with or interested in mainland Chinese politics, he does not 
join such discussions. Mainstream media and official party 
and government websites are Citizen 4’s main sources of 
news, as well as insider news from private Labor and 
Victorian government sources.
Citizen 4 uses his chat group as a forum to educate people 
about Labor policies, to influence them to commit to 
Australian domestic politics, and to offer interpretations of 
Australian politics from a Chinese-Malaysian perspective. He 
often says in groups that having been discriminated against 
because of his racial identity in Malaysia, he is keenly aware 
of social issues, such as equality for disadvantaged groups 
including women; refugees; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgen-
der, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI) community members; and 
Muslims. He is committed to raising awareness of such issues 
among PRC migrants, who he believes still have a long way 
to go to becoming better-integrated multicultural Australians. 
Citizen 4 encourages PRC migrants and their children to par-
ticipate in Australian public life, including debates during the 
election campaign. He advocates taking responsibility into 
one’s own hands, by posting rhetorical questions such as: 
“Can your son be director of a major hospital and your daugh-
ter the CEO of a large corporation?” He urges the Chinese 
community to “break the glass ceiling and pave the way for 
future generations.”
Like other long-time Australian migrants, Citizen 4 is 
deeply concerned about how multiculturalism is understood 
in the Chinese community and has repeatedly told people in 
chat groups that racism should be rejected from within and 
without. As he has said both on WeChat and in our informal 
interviews with him, Chinese migrants should stand up to the 
racism that targets them; however, they should also resist 
labeling and stereotyping other migrant communities. He 
says that it is racially and socially divisive to use terms such 
as “African gang” when discussing a crime and that this 
underlines basic Australian values of respect and equality. 
“How would you feel,” he asks, “if one day the term ‘Chinese 
gang’ was used to describe a few individuals from the 
Chinese community?” He urges Chinese migrants to do 
some soul searching and truly embrace Australian values.
Citizen 4 is not alone in promoting Australian values. 
Many others have joined the chorus singing the praises of 
multiculturalism and Australian values via WeChat, often 
citing Australian government reports, mainstream media 
sources, and academic papers, particularly when the commu-
nity is divided on a particular social issue, such as the Safe 
Schools program and refugees and welfare payments. Debates 
between Liberal and Labor supporters frequently escalate 
into emotionally charged statements made with the sole inten-
tion of offending. It is equally common to see such disre-
spectful remarks being criticized by influential members like 
Citizen 4, and individuals apologizing for their remarks in 
response to moral pressure from other group members. 
During the election campaign, Citizen 4 spent an enormous 
amount of time in various chat groups informing members 
about Australian politics and Labor’s social and economic 
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policies, calling out fake news and false allegations against 
Labor candidates, and engaging in full-frontal arguments 
with detractors, mostly Liberal supporters. For these reasons, 
he is both highly respected and influential in chat groups, 
especially among Labor supporters, albeit controversial in 
other people’s eyes. Despite his seniority in age and experi-
ence, he has occasionally been ridiculed by some group mem-
bers who disagree with him. He takes such attacks with grace: 
“I have no selfish motivations [for participating in political 
debates] and I maintain my integrity.” Citizen 4 is one of 
WeChat’s—and the Chinese community’s—most highly 
respected members; even some of his opponents secretly 
admire his wit, energy, and contributions to the community.
Citizen 5: The Importance of Being Cosmopolitan
Citizen 5, aged 47, is another migrant of Chinese heritage 
from Malaysia. Unlike Citizen 4, he has a more cosmopoli-
tan perspective in strategic thinking and planning. He has 
worked in the IT and entertainment sectors and lived in 
Beijing, Hong Kong, Taipei, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur 
prior to settling in Perth in 2011 as a skilled migrant. His 
connection with Perth started in the early 1990s as an inter-
national student. After returning to Perth as a mature man, he 
then obtained a law degree and practiced migration and 
investment law in 2017 and 2018, respectively. He is now a 
partner of a Perth-based legal firm and well-connected in the 
West Australian Labor Party.
Citizen 5 was among the very first users of WeChat in 
2011, when the app was still being trialed, having been intro-
duced to it by his WeChat-developer friends. He likes 
WeChat for its efficiency in communicating with like-minded 
Chinese migrants, but he is wary of the public nature of chat 
groups and their potentially negative consequences; hence, 
he is not interested in joining many such groups. He manages 
just one chat group, comprising mostly Perth-based Chinese 
migrants, which aims to enhance Australian-Chinese legal 
and political awareness, irrespective of education, profes-
sion, or experience. Apart from this, Citizen 5 maintains a 
Weibo blog with 565,266 followers, where he posts prolifi-
cally on migration and investment issues in Australia.
Like Citizen 4, Citizen 5 believes in educating new 
migrants and facilitating their integration into mainstream 
Australia. When group discussions digress from Australian 
politics, he posts a message saying, “Let’s not digress. This 
group’s main concern is Australia—its history, politics, law, 
foreign policy, public life, and democracy.” He adopts a 
much less confrontational pedagogic style than Citizen 4, 
preferring a gentler form of teaching. In June 2019, follow-
ing the announcement of the Order of Australia awards, one 
group member commented that he liked Australia’s national 
anthem. In response, Citizen 5 posted the lyrics of the 
anthem, and in a series of posts asked, “Have you noticed 
that someone recently suggested tweaking the wording of the 
anthem?” “The suggestion is to change ‘young and free’ to 
‘strong and free’.” “Personally, I agree with this. This coun-
try of ours is not young.” “If we insist on using ‘young’, we 
are effectively negating the existence of Aboriginal people.” 
“We would be robbing them of their sovereignty.” Someone 
responded by saying, “But Aboriginal people lived tribally, 
not as a nation-state.” Someone else chimed in, “If you 
change the wording, you’ll also need to move Australia Day, 
right?” to which Citizen 5 replied, “Indeed, it just shows how 
complex these issues are. And politicians need to take all 
these things into account before arriving at a decision.”
As a cosmopolitan and multinational from “Greater 
China,” Citizen 5 is familiar with China and well acquainted 
with mainland Chinese migrants’ culture, politics, and men-
tality. He believes in careful management—not only of his 
chat group but also in his main long-term political ambition—
to incubate the next generation of leaders among second- and 
third-generation Chinese Australians. Hence, he is actively 
involved in the Labor Party in WA, selecting and training 
young and talented Chinese Australians to be next-generation 
political leaders. Cultivating political awareness and multi-
cultural citizenship takes a long time and is not confined to 
election campaigns. It requires awareness-raising at the grass-
roots level among migrants and their children.
Citizen 5 is highly regarded for his leadership by group 
members. Occasionally, he sets an agenda or proposes a topic 
(e.g., raising bilingual children in Australia) for his group, 
and encourages members to have meaningful and focused 
debate on that issue, rather than allowing discussions to 
meander in multiple directions. During the election cam-
paign, he strictly forbade party politics and banned anybody 
who launched into attacking opponents. He is proud of his 
group, which he describes as “scandal free.” It is a breath of 
fresh air in the jungle of in-group fighting, fake news, and 
defamatory attacks that characterize numerous other chat 
groups. High “stickiness” characterizes his chat group, its 
members tending to stay in his group for sensible and calm 
discussions on issues of common interest—unlike some 
groups whose members join and exit in high volumes due to 
the frequent occurrence and poor management of discord and 
confrontation. Observing how the mainstream media report 
on the Chinese and WeChat, Citizen 5 believes that WeChat is 
not fundamentally different from other social media plat-
forms. To him, mainstream media tend to “racialize” WeChat. 
He thinks that like Twitter and Facebook, WeChat is a double-
edged sword, especially for political candidates, and that all 
platforms can be both positive and negative for candidates.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our research suggests that the use of WeChat enabled a much 
higher level of political engagement among Mandarin-
speaking Australians in the 2019 federal election. In addi-
tion, for the first time, politically oriented WeChat groups 
emerged before the election to provide hitherto unavailable 
platforms for these voters. Some group members have taken 
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on the self-appointed role of sharing and assessing informa-
tion and informing and shaping debates. We found that bet-
ter-educated older men tend to assume leadership roles in 
this online political space. While some political parties have 
turned to WeChat during the 2019 election campaign, par-
ticularly in key marginal seats with a high population of 
Mandarin-speaking voters (Sun, 2019), our research has 
pointed to an incipient civic information strategy, a new citi-
zenship identity style, and a self-initiated and self-sustained 
process of citizenship-making in its infancy.
Our discussion supports the view (Isin & Ruppert, 2015) 
that it is not that individuals adopt democratic values before or 
after they inhabit these digital forums; rather, it is that they 
begin the process of becoming a democratic citizen only while 
learning to behave in a civil manner informationally in these 
spaces. Their digital actions are voluntary, individualized, self-
expressive, organized through online networks instead of for-
mal groups, and not affiliated with institutions. And the role 
of individual WeChat members in mentoring, modeling, and 
teaching a democratic ethos, values, and practices is crucial.
Political communication research has identified a shift 
from a traditional paradigm of dutiful citizenship (DC) toward 
more self-actualizing (AC) styles of civic participation 
(Bennett et al., 2011, 2009). The former describes a citizen 
identity style marked by an attention to political institutions 
(major parties, voting, etc.), following political news in the 
media, and meeting legal citizenship obligations. The latter 
describes a style adopted mostly by digital natives, who prefer 
to engage in issues that reflect personal values outside institu-
tional structures, and participate in politics not out of a sense 
of obligation but out of a desire to “do it for themselves” 
(Coleman, 2008, p. 189). Research in Australia has also identi-
fied the shift from dutiful to self-actualizing citizenship, 
especially in the context of young people’s digital political 
participation in Australian politics (Vromen, 2017). Adopting 
a new civic information style, these “actualizing” leaders are 
best described as voluntary, individualized, self-expressive 
and antiauthoritarian individuals who are not affiliated with 
institutions but organized through online networks and con-
nective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Their leadership, 
although informal, is established through their individual 
capacity to produce, share, interpret, and assess information. 
In the case studies discussed above, we can indeed see 
glimpses of some “actualizing” citizens-in-the-making among 
Mandarin-speaking first-generation Chinese Australians.
The role of these exemplary citizens as providers, asses-
sors, and interpreters of information derives from their ability 
to access, select, and post news stories and political informa-
tion in English and Chinese from a wide range of social 
media, newspapers, television, and search engines, often pro-
viding their own summaries, interpretations, and Chinese 
translations. Group members often look to these individuals 
to inform their opinions, knowing that they are exposed to a 
diverse array of news and perspectives. In this sense, what we 
have discovered resembles the “two-step communication” 
model made widely known by communication study pioneers 
such as Lazarsfeld et al. (1968). Our study has also provided 
fresh evidence supporting Katz’s comment at the 2018 
International Communication Association conference that the 
two-step communication model is still relevant in the digital 
era, particularly in the communication environment inhabited 
by new migrants. In fact, we found that the two-step com-
munication initiated by exemplary Chinese Australians via 
WeChat to be a defining aspect of citizen-making and citizen-
ship-becoming processes in the digital era.
Apart from these insights on digital citizenship and actu-
alizing citizens-in-the-making among Chinese migrants in 
Australia, we have also found that WeChat enables some 
older-generation Chinese community leaders to connect with 
and educate new PRC migrants. These individuals, though 
small in number, seem to depart from the long-standing per-
ception of Chinese migrants as politically passive and disen-
gaged. Citizen 4 is such an individual. Drawing on his 
experience of having also lived in Malaysia, he is able to 
impart his knowledge of multiculturalism and its practices to 
newcomers, thereby proving himself to be an invaluable 
teacher and mentor. From being a leader among predigital 
Chinese Australians, he has successfully “migrated” to 
WeChat in order to reach out to more recent arrivals from 
China. His voluntary involvement points to the potential of 
encouraging and mobilizing older-generation Chinese 
Australians to connect with and pass wisdom on to newcom-
ers. Future studies of the political socialization of Chinese 
migrants will need to take account of this indicative finding, 
particularly in exploring new ways of building connections 
between older and newer generations of Chinese migrants. 
Furthermore, although we found that some women main-
tained active voices in group discussions, WeChat group 
managers and leaders were mostly men. Future work needs 
to consider the gendered implications of this finding.
Political science research in Australia (e.g., Bilodeau et al., 
2010) indicates that first-generation migrants from authoritar-
ian societies display both authoritarian imprints and demo-
cratic desires; they tend to have lower levels of confidence in 
Australia’s political institutions, and many may carry with 
them a fear of the state’s political instruments (Pietsch & 
McAllister, 2016). Citizen 3 arrived in Australia in 1989, in 
the midst of an intensely oppressive era in Chinese history, yet 
he seems to be exceptionally engaged politically here, perhaps 
precisely because of his past experience with an authoritarian 
regime. And it is digital media platforms such as WeChat that 
have enabled him to do that. Our research suggests that while 
existing insights about new migrants’ lack of confidence are 
relevant, it is now essential to refine such findings by factoring 
in these individuals’ almost ubiquitous use of digital media.
Finally, our discussion has made a modest start in refur-
bishing the analytical concept of digital citizenship. By 
exploring the migrant’s transition from an authoritarian to a 
democratic society, and then demonstrating the potential 
of digital social media as educational tools promoting 
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democratic values and positive politicization, our research 
takes a small step toward rectifying this problem.
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